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        See, for example, Larrain, Reisen and Von Maltzan (1997), who find evidence that ratings1
“Granger-cause” sovereign bond yield spreads.
        For an analysis of twin crises episodes, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).2
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I.  Introduction
Sovereign credit ratings play a crucial role in determining the terms and the extent to
which countries have access to international capital markets.  Some studies have found that
changes in credit ratings have a significant impact on sovereign bond yield spreads.   Sovereign1
credit ratings are supposed to serve as a summary measure of a country’s likelihood of default. 
Upon a casual inspection of the sovereign credit ratings of a cross-section of countries, it is
therefore not surprising to find that the countries with the lowest ratings are those that are unable
to borrow from the international capital market altogether and depend on official loans from
multilateral institutions or from individual governments.  The sovereign rating also influences the
terms at which the private sector can borrow from international sources. 
While for industrial countries capital market access is usually taken for granted--emerging
markets (EMs) access to international capital markets is precarious and highly variable.  It is for
the EMs that the credit ratings play their most critical role.  
In principle, there is no reason why changes in sovereign credit ratings should be
expected to systematically predict a currency crisis or a banking crisis.  After all, industrial
countries have had their share of currency crises (i.e., France and the United Kingdom in the
1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis), banking crises (Japan, the S&L crisis in the United
States), or both simultaneously (i.e., the Nordic countries and Spain).   In practice, however, in2
emerging markets (EMs) there is a strong link between currency crises and banking crises and
3default.  The numerous financial crises in the 1990s and the colossal bail-out packages that were
put together in an effort to circumvent default attest to this link.  Hence, if the credit ratings are
forward-looking, financial crises in EMs should be systematically preceded by downgrades.
Yet, the recent anecdotal evidence does not suggest that financial crises were preceded by
downgrades in credit ratings.  As the chronology in Table 1 illustrates, the downgrades appear to
materialize after and not before the crises in Asia; Mexico was upgraded shortly before the
December 1994 crisis--which absent the United States-International Monetary Fund bail-out
would have ended in default. A question that arises from these recent episodes is if this failure on
the part of the rating agencies to anticipate debt servicing difficulties is more generalized and
systematic.
4Table 1. Performance of Ratings Agencies Prior to Asian Crisis:
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s Long Term Debt Ratings, 1996-1997
      Jan. 15, 1996       Dec. 2, 1996          Jun 24, 1997       Dec. 12, 1997
Rating Outlook Rating Outlook Rating Outlook Rating Outlook
MOODY’S   Foreign Currency Debt
Indonesia Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3
Malaysia A1 A1 A1 A1
Mexico Ba2 Ba2 Ba2 Ba2
Philippines Ba2 Ba2 Ba2 Ba2
South Korea A1 A1 stable Baa2 negative
Thailand A2 A2 A2 Baa1 negative
STANDARD AND POOR’S      October 1997
Indonesia Foreign Currency BBB stable BBB stable BBB stable BBB negative
Debt
Domestic Currency A+ A+ A- negative
Debt
Malaysia Foreign Currency A+ stable A+ stable A+ positive A+ negative
Debt
Domestic Currency AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ negative
Debt
Philippines Foreign Currency BB positive BB positive BB+ positive BB+ stable
Debt
Domestic Currency BBB+ BBB+ A- A- stable
Debt
South Korea Foreign Currency AA- stable AA- stable
Debt
Domestic Currency
Debt
Thailand Foreign Currency A stable A stable A stable BBB negative
Debt
Domestic Currency AA AA A negative
Debt
Mexico Foreign Currency BB negative BB
Debt BB
Domestic Currency BBB+ BBB+ stable BBB+ positive
Debt
Note: Rating Systems (from highest to lowest)
Moody’s :  Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3
S&P’s : AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998).
      They present evidence that the recessions following devaluations are deeper in Ems than in3
developed economies.
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Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), who examine the links between currency and
banking crises and changes in sovereign credit ratings for 20 countries for Institutional Investor
and Moody’s find mixed evidence on rating agencies ability to anticipate debt servicing
difficulties.  Neither of the ratings predict banking crises but they present some evidence that the
Moody’ ratings have some (very low) predictive power for currency crises.
In this paper, I cast the net wider.  Depending on the rating agency, I examine the links
between crises and rating changes for anywhere between 46 to 62 countries.  The analysis is also
extended to include Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings and a variety of approches to date the
currency and banking crises.  Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have suggested that one of the reasons
why EMs may fear devaluations (or large depreciations) is that these are often followed by a lss
of access to international credit--which, in turn, leads to severe recessions.   Hence, in this paper I3
also review the evolution of credit ratings after the crises--with an emphasis on analyzing if there
are distinct patterns for developed and emerging economies.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I attempt to evaluate the predictive ability of
sovereign credit ratings using the approach taken in much of the literature on currency and, more
recently, banking crises and estimate a family of probit models.  In Section III, I tabulate the
descriptive statistics for the ratings along the lines of the “signals” approach and compare how
these stack up to the other leading indicators that have been analyzed.  This section also discusses
some of the macroeconomic indicators that rating agencies focus on in their rating decisions. 
Section IV focuses on the behavior of sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of crises, while the
      An unbalanced panel, in this case, refers to the fact that we do not have the same number of4
observations for all the countries.
       This approach follows the procedure adopted in Cantor and Packer (1996a and 1996b).5
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concluding section discusses the implications of the findings and possible extentions of this
analysis.
II. Sovereign Credit Ratings on the Eve of Crises
In this section, we examine the link between changes in sovereign credit ratings and
currency and banking crises.  In particular, we focus on whether there is evidence that
downgrades in credit ratings systematically precede the financial crises. 
My analysis covers the sovereign credit ratings issued by Moody’s Investor Service and
Institutional Investor (II), and Standard and Poor’s. The II sample begins in 1979 and runs
through 1999.  For the Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings, we have an unbalanced panel.  4
For II, the ratings are an index that runs from zero (least creditworthy) to 100 (most
creditworthy). The II rankings are reported twice a year and are changed frequently.  For
Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s, which uses multiple letters to characterize a sovereign’s
creditworthyness, I map their letter ratings into sixteen possible categories, with sixteen
corresponding to the highest rating and zero to the lowest.   To illustrate for the case of5
Moody’s, this scale is reproduced in Table 2.  The ratings may be changed at any time, hence we
have the month during which any changes took place.  Unlike the II rankings, rating changes are
far more rare.
The country coverage of our sample for the three ratings is shown on Table 3. With 62
       Their sample consisted of 20 countries.6
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countries, II constitutes the largest sample.  The smallest sample is Standard and Poor’s with 46
countries included; nonetheless, this is more than twice the size of the sample used in Goldstein,
Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).6
1. Methodology issues
To assess if sovereign credit ratings systematically help predict currency and banking
crises, I must first date the crises.  I construct a three currency crises indices.  This allows me to
assess whether the links between the ratings and the crises results are sensitive to the definition of
crises used.  The first of these crisis indices is that used in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for 20
countries--but now extended to the  larger sample.
The second is the crisis definition employed by Frankel and Rose (1996).  While the third is a
modified version of Frankel and Rose, that includes “milder” crises episodes.
The Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) crisis index (KR), I, is a weighted average of the rate of
change of the exchange rate, )e/e, and of reserves, )R/R, with weights such that the two
components of the index have equal sample volatilities,
                  I = ()e/e) - (F /F )*( )R/R) (1)e R
where F  is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate and F  is thee               R
standard deviation of the rate of change of reserves. Since changes in the exchange rate enter with
a positive weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of this index
that were three standard deviations or more above the mean were cataloged as crises.
      Similar results are obtained looking at sigificant departures in inflation from a six-month and7
twelve-month moving average.
      Frankel and Rose (1996).8
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For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, the construction of the index was modified.
While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low-to-moderate inflation, a
devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace during hyperinflation. A single index for the
countries that had hyperinflation episodes would miss sizable devaluations and reserve losses in
the moderate inflation periods, since the historic mean is distorted by the high-inflation episode.
To avoid this, we divided the sample according to whether inflation in the previous six months
was higher than 150% and then constructed an index for each subsample.  As noted in earlier7
studies which use the signals approach, the dates of the crises map well onto the dates obtained if
one were to rely exclusively on events, such the closing of the exchange markets or a change in
the exchange rate regime, to define crises.
The Frankel and Rose (FR) definition is a devaluation in a given month of 25 percent or
greater--which is at least 10 percent greater than the devaluation in the preceding month.  8
The modified version of the FR index (MFR) classifies as crises a devaluation in a given month of
20 percent or greater--which is at least 5 percent greater than the devaluation in the preceding
month.
For dating banking crises we relied on three studies. The Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
definition which stressed events.  Specifically, they mark the beginning of a banking crisis by
two types of events: (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public
sector of one or more financial institutions (as in Venezuela 1993); and (ii) if there are no runs,
9the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial
institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other
financial institutions (as in Thailand 1997).  Secondly, I  also incorporate the crises dates in Barth,
Caprio, and Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), which allows us to cover a much
larger sample of countries.
Next, I assess the predictive ability of ratings via probit estimation. The dependent
variable is a crisis dummy (banking and currency crises are considered separately) and the
independent variable is the 12-month change in the credit rating lagged one year. 
Alternative specifications, such as the 6-month change in the credit rating lagged six months are
also considered.
The basic premise underpinning the simple postulated model is as follows.  If the credit
rating agencies are using all available information on the economic “fundamentals” to form their
rating decisions, then: (i) credit ratings should help predict crises--if the macroeconomic
indicators on which the ratings are based have some predictive power and; (ii) the simple model
should not be misspecified--that is, other indicators should not be statistically significant, since
that information would already presumably reflected in the ratings themselves.  Thus, the state of
the macroeconomic fundamentals would be captured in a single indicator--the ratings.
Recent studies that have examined the determinants of credit ratings do provide support for the
basic premise that ratings are significantly linked with selected economic fundamentals (see Lee,
1993 and Cantor and Packer, 1996a).  For example, Cantor and Packer (1996a) find that per
capita GDP, inflation, the level of external debt, and indicators of default history and of economic
development are significant determinants of sovereign ratings.  The question which we seek
10
answer is whether these are the “right” set of fundamentals, when it comes to predicting financial
crises.
Table 2. Scale for Moody's Foreign Currency Debt Rating
Rating Scale Assigned Value
Aaa 16
Aa1 15
Aa2 14
Aa3 13
A1 12
A2 11
A3 10
Baa1 9
Baa2 8
Baa3 7
Ba1 6
Ba2 5
Ba3 4
B1 3
B2 2
B3 1
C 0
Sources: Moody’s and the authors.
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Table 3. The Sample
 Institutional Investors: biannual observations, 1979-1999 for 62 countries
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland,
Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.    
Moody’s Investor Service: monthly observations, unbalanced panel for 48 countries
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United
States, Uruguay and, Venezuela.
Standard and Poor’s: monthly observations, unbalanced panel for 46 countries
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United States,
and, Uruguay.  
2. Empirical evidence
 Tables 4-6 present the results of the probit estimation, for the II , Moody’s, and Standard
and Poor’s ratings as regressors, respectively for banking and currency crises.  The results shown
in Tables 4-6 are based on the 12-month change in the ratings, 12 months before the crisis but
alternative time horizons ranging from 6-month changes to 18- and 24- month changes at a
      A subset of these results are reported in Appendix Tables 1-3, the rest not reported here but9
are available from the author.
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variety of lag lengths produced very similar results.   The method of estimation corrected for9
serial correlation and for heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  
For II (Table 4) for which we have biannual 2,195 observations, the coefficients of the
credit ratings have the anticipated negative sign for any of the three definitions of currency crises,
that is, an upgrade reduces the probability of a crisis.  However, only for the MFR crisis definition
is the coefficient on the ratings significant at the five percent level; for the other two crisis
definitions it is significant at the ten percent level.  In all three cases, their marginal contribution to
the probability of a currency crisis is very small. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix Table 1, this
result is not robust to other specifications.  For instance, if the 6-month change in the credit
rating, 6 months before the crisis is used as a regressor, none of the coefficients are statitically
significant.  For banking crises, the II ratings are not significant for either of the crises definitions.
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Table 4. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency or Banking Crises?
Probit estimation with robust standard errors
Institutional Investor, 2,195 observations
Currency Crisis
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy Error Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.435 0.540 0.072 0.005
Definition
Frankel and Rose -0.288 0.015 0.059 0.007
Definition 
Modified Frankel and -0 .035 0.014 0.013* 0.010
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.021 0.152 0.871 0.000
Dates
Barth, Caprio and -0.006 0.0169 0.714  0.000
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache Dates 
Notes: The independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
For the Moody’s ratings (Table 5) for which we have 4,774 monthly observations, the
coefficients on the ratings variable are statistically insignificant for all the definitions of currency
and banking crises--in the case of the FR definition of currency crises, the coefficient has the
wrong sign. Hence, for the larger 48-country sample used here the Goldstein, Kaminsky, and
      For the Moody’s sovereign ratings, they had found a statistically significant coefficient for10
their 20-country sample; while signifcant, though, the marginal contribution of the ratings
variable was very small.
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Reinhart (2000) results do not hold.10
Table 5. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency or Banking Crises?
Probit estimation with robust standard errors
Moody’s, 4,774 observations
Currency Crisis
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error Level
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.217 0.761 0.412 0.001
Definition
Frankel and Rose 0.014 1.582 0.975 0.000
Definition
Modified Frankel and  -0 .647 0.091 0.481 0.003
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.170 1.102 0.873 0.001
Dates
Barth, Caprio and -0.002 1.180 0.987 0.000
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache Dates 
Notes: The independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
The Standard and Poor’s sample of 3,742 observations the results are line with those
obtained for Moody’s (Table 6).  Irrespective of the crisis definition used or the specification of
lag structure used none of the coeficients on the credit rating changes were statistically significant
15
at standard confidence levels and often had the wrong sign.
Table 6. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency or Banking Crises?
Probit estimation with robust standard errors
Standard and Poor’s, 3,742 observations
Currency Crisis
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error Level
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.08 0.091 0.772 0.001
Definition
Frankel and Rose -0.014 0.076 0.721 0.001
Definition 
Modified Frankel and  0 .532 2.720 0.845 0.003
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.012 0.765 0.654 0.001
Dates
Barth, Caprio and    0.566 2.170 0.794  0.001
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache
Dates 
Notes: The independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
These results would, on the surface, be at odds with the findings of Larraín, Reisen, and
von Maltzan (1997), who find evidence that ratings “cause” interest rate spreads. Our
interpretation, however, is that, while ratings may systematically lead yield spreads (they present
evidence of two-way causality)--yield spreads are poor predictors of crises, as highlighted in
      For a more detailed description see Lizondo, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (1998) and Goldstein,11
Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).
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Golstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).  Hence, the ratings inability to explain crises is not
inconsistent with its ability to influence spreads.  This issue will be taken up later in the paper. 
III. Credit Ratings versus Macroeconomic Indicators of Crises
I next, use the “signals” approach developed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) to
compare the performance of the ratings--and some of the economic indicators which rating
agencies focus on--to some of the other (and better) predictors of financial crises. As in the
preceding section, I begin by describing the basic methodology used.
1. A sketch of the signals approach
In a nutshell, the “signals” approach involves a set of possible outcomes is presented in
the following two-by-two matrix,11
Crisis occurs in the following No crisis occurs in the following
24 months 24 months
Signal A B
No signal C D
A perfect indicator would only have entries in cells A and D.
With this matrix we can define several useful concepts which we will use to evaluate the
performance of each indicator.  If one lacked any information on the performance of the
indicators, it is still possible to calculate, for a given sample, the unconditional probability of
17
crisis,
P(C) = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D). (2)
If an indicator sends a signal and that indicator has a reliable track record, then it can be expected
that the probability of a crisis, conditional on a signal, P(C*S), is greater than the unconditional
probability. Where
P(C*S) = A/(A+B). (3)
Formally,
P(C*S) - P(C) > 0. (4)
The intuition is clear, if the indicator is not “noisy” (prone to sending false alarms), then there are
relatively few entries in cell B and P(C*S) . 1.  This is one of the criteria that I will use to rank the
indicators. We can also define the noise-to-signal ratio, N/S as,
N/S = [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. (5)
It may be the case that an indicator has relatively few false alarms in its track record.  This could
be the result of the indicator issuing signals relatively rarely.  In this case, there is also the danger
that the indicators misses the crisis altogether (it does not signal and there is a crisis).  Hence, we
also wish to calculate for each indicator the proportion of crises accurately called, 
PC = C/(A+C). (6)
In the case of the credit ratings a downgrade in the 24 prior to the crisis would be
considered a signal.
2. Basic results
      See Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) for details.12
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Table 7 compares the performance of the ratings, and some of the economic indicators
which rating agencies focus on--to some of the better predictors of financial crises. These results
underscore the preceding ones, which used a different approach altogether. The table presents the
basic descriptive statistics that are used in the “signals” approach to gauge an indicators’ ability to
anticipate crises, namely: the noise-to-signal ratio, the percent of crises accurately called, and the
marginal predictive power (i.e. the difference between the conditional and unconditional
probabilities).  We compare II sovereign ratings to averages for the more reliable monthly and
annual indicators of economic fundamentals.  The basic story that emerges from Table 7 is that
the credit ratings perform much worse for both currency and banking crises than do the better
indicators of economic fundamentals--the individual better performing indicators are shown on
Table 8.  The noise-to-signal ratio is higher than one for both types of crises, suggesting a similar
incidence of good signals and false alarms.  Hence, not surprisingly, the marginal contribution to
predicting a crisis is small relative to the top indicators; for banking crises the marginal
contribution is nil.  Furthermore, the percent of crises called is well below those of the top
indicators.  Indeed, the II ratings compare unfavorably with even the worst indicators.   The12
results for the II ratings for larger sample considered here are even worse than those shown in
Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).
19
Table 7  Institutional Investor sovereign ratings and the fundamentals
Type of crisis and Noise-to- Percent of Difference between
indicator signal crises conditional and
(1) (2) (3)
accurately unconditional
called probability
Currency crisis:  
   Institutional Investor 1.07 29 5.2
sovereign rating  
Average of the top 5 0.45 70 19.1
monthly indicators  
Average of the top 3 0.49 36 15.4
annual indicators  
Memorandum item: 0.91 53 6.1
Debt-to-exports ratio
Banking crisis:
Institutional Investor 1.62 22 0.9
sovereign rating  
Average of the top 5 0.50 72 9.1
monthly indicators  
Average of the top 3 0.41 44 16.3
annual indicators  
Memorandum item: 1.04 56 0.9
Debt-to-exports ratio
Sources: The author and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
      See Lizondo, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Goldfajn and Valdés (1998), on the13
performance of interest rate spreads and currency forecasts, respectively.
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Table 8. Currency and banking crises:
Best performing indicators
CURRENCY CRISES BANKING CRISES
High-frequency Indicators
REAL EXCHANGE RATE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
BANKING CRISIS EQUITY PRICES
EQUITY PRICES M2 MULTIPLIER
EXPORTS OUTPUT
M2/INTERNATIONAL RESERVES EXPORTS
Low-Frequency Indicators
CURRENT ACCOUNT SHORT-TERM CAPITAL
IMBALANCE/GDP INFLOWS/GDP
CURRENT ACCOUNT CURRENT ACCOUNT
IMBALANCE/INVESTMENT IMBALANCE/INVESTMENT
Sources: The author and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
3. Why are sovereign ratings such poor predictors of financial distress?
Generally, financial crises are difficult to forecast--witness the poor performance of
international interest rate spreads and currency forecasts.   Specifically, however, the results13
presented here offer a tentative (although partial) answer to this question.  It would appear that
rating agencies have tended to focus on the “wrong” set of fundamentals--when it comes to
anticipating crises.  For instance, much weight is given to debt-to-exports ratios--yet, as shown in
Table 7 (memorandum item) these have tended to be poor predictors of financial stress.  Little
21
weight is attached to indicators of liquidity, currency misalignments, and asset price behavior,
which as highlighted in Table 8, are more reliable leading indicators of financial stress.
IV. Sovereign Credit Ratings in the Aftermath of Crises
As discussed earlier, the anecdotal evidence from the recent crises episodes suggests that
the downward adjustments in sovereign credit ratings came after the crisis was well underway.  In
this section, I  review the evolution of credit ratings after the crises--with an emphasis on
analyzing if there are distinct patterns for developed and emerging economies.
Tables 9 and 10 present several results from the analysis of the II and Moody’s sovereign
ratings, respectively.  We report a variety of statistics that are meant to capture the various
manifestations of the extent and the terms of access to international lending around currency
crises episodes.  The statistics reported include: the probability of a downgrade for various time
horizons following the currency crisis, the probability of multiple downgrades, and the level of
the assigned rating at the time of the crisis, and six and twelve months following that event.  We
also report the percent change in the ratings at several time horizons.  We report the results for
emerging and developed countries separately and test for differences among the two groups. 
Significant differences are denoted by one or more asterisks, depending on the significance level.
Turning to the II results first, as shown in the top panel of Table 9, we find no significant
differences between developed countries and EMs in the probability of a downgrade (or multiple
downgrades) following the currency crisis.  However, this is where the similarities among the two
country groups end. It is worth noting (see middle panel, Table 9) that at the time of the crisis, the
average rating for the EMs is 37.6, slightly less than half of the average score for developed
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countries.  This, of course, suggests that even in the absence of a crisis, access to international
lending is far from even for the two country groupings.  Furthermore, that vast gap widens
further in the aftermath of the devaluations associated with the currency crises.  In the twelve
months following the currency crisis, the magnitude of the downgrade is about five times greater 
for EMs than it is for developed economies.  On average, EMs’s sovereign rating index falls 10.8
percent in the twelve months following the currency crisis.  The differences between the post-
crisis downgrade for emerging and developed economies is significant at standard confidence
levels.
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Table 9.  The Probability and Magnitude of Downgrades Around Currency Crises:
Institutional Investor Sovereign Credit Ratings, 1979-1999
Probability of
(in percent)
Country a downgrade in six a downgrade in more than one downgrade
Group months following twelve months in the twelve months
the crisis following the crisis following the crisis
Emerging 39.0 79.3 31.7
Developed 38.4 73.1 30.8
Difference 0.6 6.2 0.9
Index level
At crisis period Next six months 12 months later
Emerging 37.6 36.0 33.5
Developed 76.0 74.9 74.5
Difference -38.4** -38.9** -41.0**
Magnitude of the downgrade in
(percent change)
six months the next six months the twelve months
following the crisis following the crisis
Emerging 4.3 6.9 10.9
Developed 1.4 0.5 1.9
Difference 2.8* 6.4** 8.9**
Notes: One asterisk (*) denotes significance at the ten percent level, while two asterisks (**)
denote significance at the five percent level.
Sources: Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and the author.
The gulf between EMs and developed economies is even greater when a comparable
exercise is performed for the Moody’s ratings.  As with II, the level of the ratings at the outset of
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the currency crisis is significantly lower for EMs--the sovereign rating level is about a third of that
assigned to developed economies. Also, as the II results, the magnitude of the downgrade is far
greater for EM--about 9 percent versus less than one percent for developed countries.  However,
as shown in Table 11, in the case of Moody’s sovereign ratings, both the probability of a
downgrade in the twelve months following the crisis and the probability of multiple downgrades
is significantly higher for the EMs in our sample.
Table 10.  The Probability and Magnitude of Downgrades Around Currency Crises:
Moody’s Sovereign Credit Ratings, 1979-1999
Probability of
(in percent)
Country a downgrade in six a downgrade in more than one downgrade
Group months following twelve months in the twelve months
the crisis following the crisis following the crisis
Emerging 20.0 26.7 6.7
Developed 10.0 10.0 0.0
Difference 10.0** 16.7** 6.7*
Index level
Emerging 4.9 4.5 4.3
Developed 15.0 14.9 14.9
Difference -10.1** -10.4** -10.6**
Magnitude of the downgrade in
(percent change)
six months the next six months the twelve months
following the crisis following the crisis
Emerging 8.2 4.4 12.2
Developed 0.7 0.0 0.7
Difference 7.5** 4.4** 11.5**
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Notes: One asterisk (*) denotes significance at the ten percent level, while two asterisks (**)
denote significance at the five percent level.
Sources: Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and the author.
Finally, to complement the preceding analysis, I examine whether knowing that there was
a currency crisis indeed helps to predict sovereign credit rating downgrades for emerging and
developed economies.  
For Institutional Investor, for which there is a continuous time series, we regress the six-
month change in the credit rating index on the crisis dummy variable (both currency and
banking), which takes on the value of one when there is a crisis and zero otherwise, six months
earlier.  The method of estimation is generalized least squares, correcting for both generalized
forms of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals.  For Moody’s, the dependent
variable is three-month changes in the rating, while the explanatory variable is the crisis dummy
three months earlier.  The latter specification will allow us to glean more precisely whether
downgrades follow rapidly after crises take place.  In the case of Moody’s, the sovereign rating
dependent variable is allowed to assume the value of minus one, zero, or one, depending on
whether there was a downgrade, no change, or an upgrade.  We estimate the parameters of
interest with an ordered probit technique that allows us to correct for heteroskedastic
disturbances.
The results of the estimation are summarized in Table 11 for both II and Moody’s ratings. 
In the case of EMs, currency crises help predict downgrades, irrespective which rating index is
used.  For developed countries, however, there is no conclusive evidence that ratings react to
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currency crises in a systematic and significant way.  For EMs, while the coefficients are
significant at standard confidence levels, their marginal predictive contribution remains small. 
For example, in the case of Moody’s, a currency crisis increases the likelihood of a downgrade
by five percent.  This would suggest that other economic fundamentals play an important role in
explaining changes in sovereign credit ratings (see Cantor and Packer 1996a and 1996b, on this
issue).
Table 11. Reactive Credit Ratings:  Developed and Emerging Markets
Dependent variable: Institutional Estimation method:
Investor six-month changes in sovereign OLS with robust standard errors
rating 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard  R
banking crisis (1) (2) (4)
dummy
2
is a currency or error
Developed -0.007 0.023 0.01
Emerging -0.06** 0.011 0.07
Dependent variable: Moody’s three- Estimation method:
month changes in sovereign rating Ordered probit
Independent variable Coefficient Standard Pseudo R
is a currency crisis or error
banking  dummy (1) (2) (4)
2
Developed -0.08 0.76 0.000
Emerging -0.23** 0.11 0.060
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes difference is significant at the ten percent level, while two asterisks
denote significant differences at the five percent level.
These results are also in line with the findings of Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan (1997),
who find evidence of two-way causality between sovereign ratings and market spreads.  Hence
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not only do international capital markets react to changes in the ratings, but the ratings
systematically react (with a lag) to market conditions, as reflected in the sovereign bond yield
spreads.
V. Results and  Implications
This paper has addressed the following questions: Do sovereign credit ratings
systematically help predict currency and banking crises? If not, why not? What needs to change?
What is the behavior of credit ratings following the crises? Are there important differences in the
behavior of credit ratings between developed and emerging markets?  The answers revealed by
the analysis can be summarized as follows:
As to the ability of rating changes to anticipate financial crises, the empirical tests presented here
on sovereign credit ratings and financial crises suggest that sovereign credit ratings systematically
fail to anticipate banking and currency crises.  This result appears to be robust across alternative
crises definitions, model specification, and approaches.  Only for the Institutional Investor ratings
is there some (weak) evidence that downgrades precede currency crises.  In none of the cases are
banking crises systematically preceded by downgrades.
As regards the behavior of ratings after the crisis and differences between developed and
emerging markets, there is evidence that sovereign credit ratings tend to be reactive--particularly
when it comes to EMs. Both the probability of a downgrade and the magnitude of the downgrade
are significantly higher for EMs. Taken together, these findings point to a procyclicality in the
ratings.
In a related paper (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000), also ask how these differences between
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developed and emerging markets in access to international capital markets influence the
outcomes of a currency crisis--particularly as regards output.  They present evidence that EMs
are, indeed, very different from developed economies in several key dimensions.  In EMs
devaluations, or large depreciations for that matter, are contractionary, the adjustments in the
current account are far more acute and abrupt.  Hence, currency crises become credit crises as
sovereign credit ratings often collapse following the currency collapse and access to international
credit is lost.
On why are sovereign ratings such poor predictors of financial distress, we conclude that
generally, financial crises are difficult to forecast--witness the poor performance of international
interest rate spreads and currency forecasts.  Specifically, however, the results presented here
offer a tentative (although partial) answer to this question.  Rating agencies have tended to focus
on the “wrong” set of fundamentals.  For instance, much weight is given to debt-to-exports
ratios--yet these have tended to be poor predictors of financial stress.  Little weight is attached to
indicators of liquidity, currency misalignments, and asset price behavior.
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Appendix Table 1. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict 
Currency or Banking Crises?
Alternative specification, probit estimation with robust standard errors
Institutional Investor, 2257 observations
Currency Crisis
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error Level
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.335 1.540 0.2872 0.001
Definition
Frankel and Rose -0.022 0.029 0.435 0.001
Definition
Modified Frankel and -0.054 0.024 0.024 0.008
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.023 0.193 0.762 0.000
Dates
Barth, Caprio and    0.007 0.031 0.826   0.000
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache
Dates 
 Number of observations for each sample are shown in parentheses.1
Notes: The independent variable is the 6-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
Sources: The author.
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Appendix Table 2. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict 
Currency or Banking Crises?
Alternative specification, probit estimation with robust standard errors
Moody’s, 5058 observations
Currency Crisis
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error Level
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.041 1.023 0.913 0.000
Definition
Frankel and Rose 0.001 1.582 0.988 0.000
Definition
Modified Frankel and -0.098 0.123 0.425 0.003
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart 0.032 0.863 0.814 0.000
Dates
Barth, Caprio and -0.014 1.223 0.943 0.000
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache
Dates
 Number of observations for each sample are shown in parentheses.1
Notes: The independent variable is the 6-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
Sources: The author.
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Appendix Table 3. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict
Currency and Banking Crises?
Probit estimation with robust standard errors
Standard and Poor’s, 4042 observations
Currency Crises
Dependent Variable: Coefficient Standard Significance Pseudo R
Crisis Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error Level
2
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.013 0.126 0.721 0.001
Definition
Frankel and Rose -0.267 0.051 0.600 0.001
Definition 
Modified Frankel and 0.356 2.336 0.879 0.000
Rose Definition 
Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart -0.014 0.548 0.761 0.000
Dates
Barth, Caprio and   0.379   1.841      0.837 0.000
Levine, or Kaminsky
and Reinhart, or
Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache
Dates
 Number of observations for each sample are shown in parentheses.1
Notes: The independent variable is the 6-month change in the sovereign credit rating one year
earlier.
Source: The author.
